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Abstract
In a marvelous but somewhat neglected paper, ’The Corporation: Will It Be
Managed by Machines?’ Herbert Simon articulated from the perspective of 1960
his vision of what we now call the New Economy the machine-aided system of
production and management of the late twentieth century. Simon’s analysis sprang
from what I term the principle of cognitive comparative advantage: one has to un-
derstand the quite different cognitive structures of humans and machines (includ-
ing computers) in order to explain and predict the tasks to which each will be most
suited. Perhaps unlike Simon’s better-known predictions about progress in artifi-
cial intelligence research, the predictions of this 1960 article hold up remarkably
well and continue to offer important insights. ¡P¿In what follows I attempt to tell
a coherent story about the evolution of machines and the division of labor between
humans and machines. Although inspired by Simon’s 1960 paper, I weave many
other strands into the tapestry, from classical discussions of the division of labor
to present-day evolutionary psychology. The basic conclusion is that, with growth
in the extent of the market, we should see humans ’crowded into’ tasks that call
for the kinds of cognition for which humans have been equipped by biological
evolution. These human cognitive abilities range from the exercise of judgment in
situations of ambiguity and surprise to more mundane abilities in spatio-temporal
perception and locomotion. Conversely, we should see machines ’crowded into’
tasks with a well-defined structure. This conclusion is not based (merely) on a
claim that machines, including computers, are specialized idiots-savants today
because of the limits (whether temporary or permanent) of artificial intelligence;
rather, it rests on a claim that, for what are broadly ’economic’ reasons, it will
continue to make economic sense to create machines that are idiots-savants.
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Introduction. 
I had the chance to interact with Herbert Simon on only one occasion.  But the 
circumstances were somewhat exotic.  Simon and I were among a number of 
Western scholars invited to a conference in Warsaw in 1988, the year before 
everything changed.  The objective of the conference was to interact with Polish 
scholars — philosophers, mostly — on the theme of “praxeology,” the study of 
human action.  I have vivid memories of sitting at a small table in our shabby 
hotel drinking terrible Romanian wine and listening to Simon and Donald 
McCloskey debating the merits of deconstructionism.  (McCloskey thought 
deconstructionism had much to contribute; Simon thought it was the stupidest 
thing he had ever heard of.)  I also remember Simon’s general intellectual 
engagement and wide-ranging interests.  He was the only one among us who 
made an attempt at the Polish language, and he tied to speak to people from his 
phrasebook whenever he could. 
This encounter largely confirmed for me the impression of the man I had 
gained from reading his work over the years: a searching intellect, great 
originality, and a willingness to take strong and clear positions.  I hope that all 
these attributes will also show through in this essay, which takes as its reading 
one of the more obscure works in the Simonian canon.  In 1960, the editors of a 
volume challenged Simon to answer this question: “The Corporation: Will It Be 
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Managed by Machines?”1  In this marvelous but somewhat neglected paper, he 
articulated his vision of what the “knowledge economy” of the future — 1985! — 
would look like.  Perhaps surprisingly for someone given to the most strident 
predictions of the speedy and inevitable success of artificial intelligence, Simon 
in this article is clear that computers and humans have fundamentally different 
cognitive comparative advantages.   
[M]an's comparative advantage in energy production has been 
greatly reduced in most situations -- to the point where he is no 
longer a significant source of power in our economy.  He has been 
supplanted also in performing many relatively simple and 
repetitive eye-brain-hand sequences.  He has retained his greatest 
comparative advantage in: (1) the use of his brain as a flexible 
general-purpose problem-solving device, (2) the flexible use of his 
sensory organs and hands, and (3) the use of his legs, on rough 
terrain as well as smooth, to make this general-purpose sensing-
thinking-manipulating system available wherever it is needed.  
(Simon 1960, p. 31.) 
In what follows I explore this notion of cognitive comparative advantage and use 
it to tell what (I hope) is a coherent story about the evolution of machines and of 
the division of labor between humans and machines.  Although inspired by 
Simon’s 1960 paper, my account weaves many additional strands into a tapestry 
of my own design, from classical discussions of the division of labor to present-
day evolutionary psychology.  I touch both on the history of what has been said 
about humans and machines and on the often fiery debates in artificial 
intelligence – debates in which Simon was so prominent.  But I do not take on the 
                                                 
1  The volume was intended to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Graduate 
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difficult task of assessing and appraising those weighty topics comprehensively 
and fairly.   
In the end, my basic conclusion is broadly consistent with that in Simon’s 
1960 paper.  With growth in the extent of the market, we should see humans 
“crowded into” tasks that call for the kinds of cognition for which humans have 
been equipped by biological evolution.  These human cognitive abilities range 
from the exercise of judgment in situations of ambiguity and surprise to more 
mundane abilities in spatio-temporal perception and locomotion.  This 
conclusion is not based (merely) on a claim that machines, including computers, 
are specialized idiots-savants today because of the limits (whether temporary or 
permanent) of artificial intelligence; rather, it rests on a claim that, for what are 
broadly “economic” reasons, it will continue to make sense to create machines 
that are idiots-savants. 
The division of labor. 
At least since the first Industrial Revolution, people have pondered the 
relationship between humans and machines.  How will machines change life and 
work?  How will they change the role of humans?  Although many have 
conceptualized the interaction between human and machine as a progressive 
displacement of the former by the latter, writers like Adam Smith and Charles 
Babbage envisaged a far more complex relationship.   
                                                                                                                                                 
School of Industrial Administration at what was then Carnegie Tech. 
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In Smith’s account, production is a matter of discrete tasks or stages, each 
with its own set of specialized tools.  Under the sort of crafts production that 
precedes the division of labor, the artisan masters and coordinates multiple 
stages of production and wields a variety of specialized tools.  As growth in the 
extent of the market makes it economical to subdivide labor, the artisans begins 
to specialize in a smaller subset of operations and tools.  To do this, the artisan 
must now cooperate with other artisans in a more carefully orchestrated way.  
Workers become complements to one another rather than substitutes 
(Leijonhufvud 1986).  And the coordination function that the artisans themselves 
once supplied must now be hardwired to a greater degree into the spatial and 
temporal “interfaces” among specialized operations and specialized operatives.  
Each operative must make his or her output relatively standardized so that the 
next operative down the line knows what to expect; and each operative must 
hand over that output at a predictable time, lest buffer inventories run dry and 
the entire production process come to a crashing halt. 
Smith attributed the benefits of this organizational transformation to three 
sources: “first to the increase of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, 
to the saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing from one species of 
work to another; and lastly, to the invention of a great number of machines 
which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of 
many” (Smith 1976, I.i.5).   
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The first source is clearly cognitive.2  By narrowing their focus, the 
operatives are able to deepen their skills through learning by doing.  Writing a 
few decades after Smith, Charles Babbage recognized the larger cognitive 
implications:  that the division of labor applies to mental operations in general as 
much to as to mechanical ones.  He recounts the story of the French 
mathematician Prony, who stumbled across a copy of the Wealth of Nations and 
suddenly realized that he could use the division of labor to calculate logarithm 
tables3 (Babbage 1835, chapter 20).  Babbage goes further, suggesting that a 
machine might take over from humans not only mechanical tasks but some of 
these intellectual tasks as well.  What he had in mind, of course, was the never-
finished “analytical engine” often hailed as the first computer.  (Machines as 
information processors is major theme to which we will return.) 
                                                 
2  Although not perhaps obvious at first, the benefits of less switching among tasks is also at 
base a cognitive matter, as Henrik Houtthaker explains.  “The indivisibility of the individual 
consists in the fact that, although it may be capable of a great many different activities, it can 
perform only few activities simultaneously because most activities utilize the same resources 
and more particularly that coordinating resource which is known as the brain.  The larger 
the number of simultaneous activities, the greater the difficulty of coordinating them and of 
carrying out each one properly, and the smaller therefore the output from each activity.  
This applies  not only to simultaneous activities, but also to activities that are spread out 
over time.  In the first place some shorter or longer interval is usually needed to switch from 
one activity to another; in the second place it is usually easier to perform activities that are 
known from previous experience than to perform them for the first time.  All this, the 
economist will note at once, can be put in terms of increasing returns. We have increasing 
returns to the extent that, if several activities are replaced by a single one, there is less need 
for coordination and switching time and more scope for acquiring experience.  The output of 
the single activity may thus be raised above the combined outputs of the several activities” 
(Houthakker 1956, p. 182).   
3  Ironic indeed that the French needed Smith to teach them the division of labor, since Smith 
lifted his account of the making of pins from the French Encyclopédie. 
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As an adherent to the British empiricist tradition — and as a good friend 
of David Hume — Smith believed that the mind starts out as essentially a tabula 
rasa and that differences in ability are the result of learning and not of any innate 
abilities.4  But what if people are born with innately different abilities?  Babbage 
pointed out that nature provides as much support for the division of labor as 
does nurture: unlike crafts production, the division of labor permits tasks to be 
allocated according to (innate) comparative advantage.5  This famous principle of 
optimal resource allocation had lately been discovered by David Ricardo.  It 
insists that allocation to tasks should be based not on who is absolutely better at 
the task but on who is relatively better.  If person A is better than person B at both 
management and secretarial work, it may yet pay to assign B all the secretarial 
work if A is relatively better (is “more better,” we might say) at management.6  If 
                                                 
4  “The difference of natural talents in different men is, in reality, much less than we are aware 
of; and the very different genius which appears to distinguish men of different professions, 
when grown up to maturity, is not upon many occasions so much the cause, as the effect of 
the division of labour.  The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a 
philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from 
nature, as from habit, custom, and education” (Smith 1976, I.ii.4). 
5  “We have seen, then, that the effect of the division of labour, both in mechanical and in 
mental operations, is, that it enables us to purchase and apply to each process precisely that 
quantity of skill and knowledge which is required for it: we avoid employing any part of the 
time of a man who can get eight or ten shillings a day by his skill in tempering needles, in 
turning a wheel, which can be done for sixpence a day; and we equally avoid the loss arising 
from the employment of an accomplished mathematician in performing the lowest processes 
of arithmetic” (Babbage 1835, Section II, Chapter 20, paragraph 250.) 
6  Those who remember their Principles of Economics know that “more better” has a precise 
interpretation in terms of the slopes of production-possibilities curves. 
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one takes a middle-ground position in the nature-nurture debate, then clearly the 
division of labor offers benefits of both the Smith and Babbage kinds.7 
Smith’s third source of benefits from the division of labor brings us finally 
to the topic of machines.  By concentrating their attention more narrowly on a 
smaller set of operations, he feels, operatives will naturally tend to invent devices 
that makes them more productive.  The reason that specialized workers are able 
to perceive opportunities to successfully mechanize (parts of) their tasks is that, 
in narrowing the range of tasks and in standardizing the interfaces between 
tasks, the division of labor makes the work more routine.8  It is a major theme of 
this essay that the human worker may need to retain discretion over some 
operations while delegating the most routine ones to machines.  Nonetheless, in 
the pure Smithian model of the division of labor, the humans themselves become 
increasingly machine-like.   
In the limit, this amounts to what Charles Sabel (1982) has branded 
fordism.  It was not really until the early twentieth century that tools and 
machining techniques were precise enough to allow genuine standardization of 
                                                 
7  Phrased this way, it is hard to disagree with the proposition that both nature and nurture 
matter.  As I will suggest below, the issue once again becomes controversial as soon as one 
asks for specifics. 
8  “It is generally agreed that Adam Smith, when he suggested that the division of labour leads 
to inventions because workmen engaged in specialised routine operations come to see better 
ways of accomplishing the same results, missed the main point. The important thing, of 
course, is that with the division of labour a group of complex processes is transformed into a 
succession of simpler processes, some of which, at least, lend themselves to the use of 
machinery” (Young 1928, p. 530). 
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parts (Hounshell 1984).  Such standardization enabled Henry Ford to take 
Smithian factory production to a new level by means of the moving assembly 
line and related techniques, which he and his engineering staff had begun 
implementing by 1913.  The Ford assembly process was above all a system, one 
designed by specialized engineers rather than by the workers themselves. (This 
is of course another manifestation of the division of labor: the design of 
production becomes itself a specialized task.9)  The system effected a complete 
redesign of production, breaking operations into simple sequences of routine 
activity that yielded standardized subassemblies.   
By transferring control of systemic issues from the workers to engineers 
and industrial designers, fordism, in the phrase popularized by Stephen Marglin 
(1974), had rendered workers deskilled.10  We need look no further than Smith 
himself for the dire implications of what fordist production would mean for the 
worker: “The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple 
operations, of which the effects are perhaps always the same, or very nearly the 
                                                 
9  “All the improvements in machinery, however, have by no means been the inventions of 
those who had occasion to use the machines.  Many improvements have been made by the 
ingenuity of the makers of the machines, when to make them became the business of a 
peculiar trade; and some by that of those who are called philosophers or men of speculation, 
whose trade it is not to do any thing, but to observe every thing; and who, upon that 
account, are often capable of combining together the powers of the most distant and 
dissimilar objects.  In the progress of society, philosophy or speculation becomes, like every 
other employment, the principal or sole trade and occupation of a particular class of 
citizens.” (Smith 1976, I.i.9, p. 21). 
10  Of course, Marx noticed this long ago.  “Intelligence in production expands in one direction, 
because it vanishes in many others.  What is lost by the detail labourers, is concentrated in 
the capital that employs them” (Marx 1961, Volume 1, Part IV, Chapter XIV, p. 361).  On this 
see also Braverman (1974). 
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same, has no occasion to exert his understanding or to exercise his invention in 
finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally 
loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and 
ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become” (Smith 1976, V.i.178). 
Mechanization. 
For many, notably those intent on criticizing capitalist work organization, this is 
pretty nearly the end of the story.  In fact, however, it is actually much nearer to 
the middle of the story.  Recall Smith’s assumptions.  Tools start out specialized 
to the various activities involved in production, but labor is unspecialized.  The 
division of labor consists in matching the specialization of labor to that of 
machines.  But this doesn’t exhaust the possibilities.  Why can’t machines change 
their level of specialization? (Ames and Rosenberg 1965). 
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When workers specialize, they reduce the range of activities in which they 
engage; but, if Smith is right, they also become more competent at the activities 
that remain.  Specializing workers thus trade wide skills for deep skills.  Let us 
for the moment take skill to mean the first concept, skill widening instead of skill 
deepening.  Define skill as the number of activities an operative or machine 
engages in.11  Clearly, a crafts artisan is more skilled in this sense than a fordist 
assembly-line worker.  Define specialization as the reciprocal of skill: the number 
of doers (humans or machines) per activity.  By this definition, specialization 
ranges between 0 (complete non-specialization) and 1 (complete specialization).  
Technology. Workers. Machines. Laborspecialization.
Machine
specialization.
A
B
C
1 3
3 3
1 1
1/3 1
1
1
1
1/3
Three activities: a1 a2 a3
Crafts 
production.
Smithian 
division of 
labor.
Volume 
effect.
 
 
Figure 1  Labor and machine specialization. 
Source: Ames and Rosenberg (1965). 
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Now consider a production process involving exactly three activities (a1, a2, a3).  
The result is a set of possibilities summarized in figure 1.  Technology A is what 
we called crafts production.  One worker undertakes all three activities, but 
machines — which are clearly tools in this case — are specialized to activities.  
Technology B is what Smith had in mind:  workers and tools are equally 
specialized to activities.  Technology 3 is the forgotten alternative: workers are 
specialized, but machines — and now they are indeed machines not just tools — 
become less specialized. 
What it means for the machines to become less specialized is that a single 
device has taken over — has automated — all three stages of production.  Many 
have traditionally conceptualized such automation as a natural extension of the 
division of labor: each worker wields specialized tools, and automation is just a 
matter of hooking the relevant tools together (and typically connecting them to 
inanimate power) so that they run by themselves.12  As we will see, however, 
creating skilled machines typically involves redesigning the work process, often 
in a radical way, so that it meets the needs of machine cognition.  As a result, the 
process may no longer look a lot like a robotic version of the human division of 
                                                                                                                                                 
11  The remainder of this paragraph follows Ames and Rosenberg (1965), who offer a more 
careful definition of terms than I attempt here. 
12  Charles Babbage, for example:  “When each process has been reduced to the use of some 
simple tool, the union of all these tools, actuated by one moving power, constitutes a 
machine” (Babbage 1835, Chapter 19, Paragraph 225).  Similarly Karl Marx, who probably 
got the idea from Babbage: “The machine proper is therefore a mechanism that, after being 
set in motion, performs with its tools the same operations that were formerly done by the 
workman with similar tools” (Marx 1961, Volume 1, Part IV, Chapter XIV, p. 374). 
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labor.  At the risk of drawing a distinction too sharply, we  might say that a tool is 
a device that amplifies human skill applied directly to tasks, whereas a machine is 
a device that takes over (often integrated) tasks from the humans, who – as we 
will see – then direct their skills to tending, maintaining, and designing the 
machine rather than directly to the production process.  A carpenter today still 
assembles a house with tools, even if those tools are now driven by small electric 
motors; but plywood is made by a machine.  In effect, tools amplify human 
abilities – both mechanical and cognitive – without fundamentally changing the 
division of labor. 
Machines are another matter.  Smith tells us that growth in the extent of 
the market drives the progressive transition from Technology A to Technology B.  
But such growth also — and perhaps more importantly — drives a transition 
from Technology B to Technology C, which we can understand as a further 
manifestation of the larger division of labor with which Smith was concerned 
(Langlois 1999a, 1999b).  One can see this point illustrated dramatically by 
visiting the Match Museum in the town of Jönköping, Sweden, which was the 
“match capital of the world” for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  In the beginning, the industry took precisely the form Smith 
predicted.  Cottagers in the town and surrounding countryside assumed a 
variety of subdivided tasks, from chopping and cutting the match wood to 
folding and gluing match boxes to the debilitating and ultimately gruesome task 
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of coating the tips with chemicals.13  But what thrust Jönköping to prominence in 
the industry was not a finer subdivision of putting-out tasks; rather, it was 
mechanization.  In 1844, the brothers Johan and Carl Lundström opened a 
factory in Jönköping to capitalize on the recently invented safety match, 
improvements to which Johan had just patented.  In 1870 they hired the inventor 
Alexander Lagerman to further mechanize the process of making matches.  
Lagerman’s machines not only assumed the tasks of humans but — more 
significantly —combined within their operations what had been many 
previously separate tasks, and they did so in a way that often differed 
dramatically from the unmechanized sequence of tasks.14  
If mechanization takes tasks entirely out of the hands of workers, are we 
left to infer, with Marx, that the progress of mechanization will inevitably 
relegate humans to an immiserated proletarian army of the unskilled and 
unemployed?  The histories of the most-developed countries clearly demonstrate 
                                                 
13  Which produced phosphorus necrosis in the workers.  The transition to the safety match 
after 1844 had the happy effect of substituting less-toxic red phosphorus for the more 
dangerous yellow phosphorus (Karlsson 1996). 
14  A more familiar example illustrates the productivity gains to be had from this process.  
Adam Smith (1976, I.1.3) describes the manufacture of pins in his day, in which ten men, 
organized according to principles of the division of labor, could make about 48,000 pins a 
day, or almost 5,000 per person per day.  By Marx’s era, making pins was already the 
business of machines, and a single machine could crank out 145,000 a day.  One woman or 
girl could supervise four machines, which means almost 600,000 per person per day (Marx 
1961, Volume 1, Part IV, Chapter XV, Section 8, p 460).  As of 1980, one person could 
supervise 24 machines, each making 500 pins a minute, or about 6 million pins per person 
per day (Pratten 1980).  That’s a two orders of magnitude increase in productivity in the first 
century as machines replaced the division of hand labor but only (!) a single order of 
magnitude increase in productivity over the next century as machines improved. 
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otherwise.  But there are also theoretical reasons to see mechanization as 
producing quite a different and rather more benignant role for humans.15   
In Figure 3, the human worker is still specialized, because he or she does 
only one thing.  But that one thing is not any of the original activities; instead, it 
is the new activity of minding the machine.  The invention of the power loom in 
1787 increased productivity over the hand loom not only because it could weave 
faster (by the mid 1820s, at any rate) but because a single person, who was no 
longer providing the motive power, could operate more than one loom16 (Landes 
1969, p. 86).  Of course, we might well view ”tending the machine” not as a 
single specialized activity but as a complex set of activities – perhaps more 
complex than the crafts activities the machine displaced.  When automatic 
telephone switches replaced the activities of human switchboard operators, 
machine tending fell to highly trained technicians and (later) programmers.  The 
backhoe, which replaced the activities of human ditch-diggers, required an 
operator with greater skill than any pick-and-shovel worker (Robertson and 
Alston 1992, p. 336).  In the telephony case, technological change increased the 
                                                 
15  In this respect, Alfred Marshall was closer to the mark than Marx.  Machinery, he writes, 
“constantly supplants and renders unnecessary that purely manual skill, the attainment of 
which was, even up to Adam Smith's time, the chief advantage of division of labour.  But 
this influence is more than countervailed by its tendency to increase the scale of 
manufactures and to make them more complex; and therefore to increase the opportunities 
for division of labour of all kinds, and especially in the matter of business management” 
(Marshall 1961, IV.ix.3). 
16  Landes (1969, p. 86) reports that “in 1833, a young man with a twelve-year old assistant 
could run four looms and turn out as much as twenty times the output of a hand worker.”  
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skill of workers because, as machines took over the more routine tasks, there 
remained (or were generated) certain complementary tasks to which machines 
are ill suited and that thus required the ministrations of skilled humans.  In the 
backhoe case, technological change did not lead to a significant redesign of the 
work process.  Instead, more-skilled machines not only aided humans in a skilled 
activity but actually called forth higher skill in the humans.  Thus both skill-
enhancing and skill-displacing technical change can be complementary to human 
skill.   
Coordination and buffering. 
As we saw, production is largely a matter of the coordination among 
tasks.17  And coordination means that each stage must somehow do the right 
things at the right time:  each stage must make decisions that are appropriate in 
light of the decisions that came before and will come after.  A crafts artisan is 
constantly interacting with and fiddling with the process of production at each 
step.  But when labor is more finely divided, parts become standardized, and 
much of the coordination among stages is designed into the process.18  What 
                                                                                                                                                 
Two looms may have been a more typical assignment, however, until the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century. 
17  “Production,” of course, means more than “making things” in the narrow sense and 
encompasses all the economic tasks necessary to get a product or service into the hands of 
the consumer.  Indeed, the consumer may also need to engage in some “production” in 
order to be able to consume (Langlois and Coşgel 1998). 
18  Clearly, increases in the extent of the market make batch production more feasible.  In a 
sufficiently large market, there is a demand for many instances of an identical object, which 
means, broadly speaking, that the production process for making the object will need to 
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limits the use of such hard-wired coordination is the complexity and 
unpredictability of the environment.  If a square hole awaits on the assembly 
line, the production process will work smoothly only if what arrives is always a 
square peg — and never a round peg, let alone a whale or a bowl of petunias.  
Indeed, the higher the throughput of a production system, the more vulnerable 
the system is to spurious variation.  If a round peg appears when a square one is 
wanted, the entire system may come to a crashing halt.    
As Simon tells us, there are fundamentally only two ways to deal with an 
unpredictable environment.  “If we want an organism or mechanism to behave 
effectively in a complex and changing environment, we can design into it 
adaptive mechanisms that allow it to respond flexibly to the demands the 
environment places on it.  Alternatively, we can try to simplify and stabilize the 
environment.  We can adapt organism to environment or environment to 
organism.” (Simon 1960, p. 33.)  Consider the problem of crossing rough terrain  
—most of the American continent in the early nineteenth century, for example.  
Like the native Americans before them, the earliest western explorers used 
Simon’s first technique: they took advantage of the adaptive mechanism of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
make many of the same decisions over and over again.  In this respect, we can think of the 
move to high-volume production as a reduction in variety in the cybernetic sense (Ashby 
1956).  This is implicit in most discussions of dominant designs and innovative regimes (for 
example Abernathy and Utterback 1978), in which innovation stops being a matter of the 
trying out of many qualitatively different alternatives and becomes a matter of refining a 
single alternative.  In the language of James March (1991), high-volume production reflects a 
transition from exploration to exploitation.  As I will suggest eventually, even the phenomenon 
of so-called mass customization is not an exception. 
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human locomotion system.  They walked and climbed, at least when there 
weren’t suitable rivers available.  But once population began gravitating west, it 
became worthwhile to use the second approach.  A steam locomotive is a high-
throughput transportation system that works phenomenally well so long as one 
first prepares the environment in order to reduce variation almost to zero.  So the 
railroad companies altered the terrain — they laid tracks — to accommodate this 
high-speed, high-volume, but inflexible technology.   
A fordist assembly line is like a railroad.  It increases throughput by 
eliminating variation, and thus makes itself vulnerable to whatever variation 
remains.  It is for this reason that such systems need to buffer environmental 
influences (Thompson 1967, p. 20) by placing human information processors 
between the uncertainty and the high-throughput production process.  At the 
same time that fordism “deskills” assembly-line workers by making their tasks 
simpler and more routine, it also surrounds those workers (or the machines that 
inevitably take on the most simple and routine tasks) with a large number of 
more flexible (more widely skilled) workers at multiple levels — from 
maintenance workers to top management.19  Uncertainty and variation can never 
                                                 
19  “There will generally be a separate set of skilled manual work departments (maintenance, 
tool and die making, and special departments that vary with the technology, such as the 
crew who lay firebricks inside steel furnaces) and skilled staff workers at the managerial 
levels (engineering, quality control and inspection, scheduling and inventory).” 
(Stinchcombe 1990, p. 64). 
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be eliminated; at best they can be pushed “up the hierarchy” to be dealt with by 
adaptable and less-specialized humans. 
As Stinchcombe (1990) sees it, these human “buffers” are information-
processing systems that mediate between a complex and uncertain environment 
and the system in need of predictability.20  Human cognition can often interpret 
complex data from the external world and translate that data into the kinds of 
routine information the productive system can use.  For example, a professor 
translates the complex information on an essay exam into a letter grade that the 
Registrar’s office can process; a physician translates the complex inputs from 
observation and medical instrumentation into a diagnosis, which results in a 
relatively unambiguous set of instructions for nurses, pharmacists, patients, etc.  
Human versus machine. 
The first industrial revolution improved productivity by assigning the task of 
providing motive power to inanimate sources like water and steam.  The hand 
weaver became a loom tender.  At the same time, machines also began to take 
over some “relatively simple and repetitive eye-brain-hand sequences” (Simon 
1960, p. 31).  To the extent that production had been (or could be) laid out as a 
                                                 
20  Frank Knight agrees. “In industrial life,” he writes, “purely routine operations are inevitably 
taken over by machinery. The duties of the machine tender may seem mechanical and 
uniform, but they are really not so throughout the operation. His function is to complete the 
carrying-out of the process to the point where it becomes entirely uniform so that the 
machine can take hold of it, or else to begin with the uniform output of the machine and 
start it on the way of diversification. Some part of the task will practically always be found 
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sequence of simple coordinated steps, a machine could perform the steps 
(perhaps in a slightly different way or in a different sequence) with greater speed 
and precision.  The specialized Smithian match maker gave way to the match-
making machine.  In the computer era, and especially in the last quarter century, 
machines have become faster not only at repetitive sequences of tasks in general 
but at repetitive calculations in particular.  We often call such calculation 
“information processing.”  If, as I’ve argued, the human ability to buffer 
variation is a matter of information processing, will the computer eventually take 
over from the human buffers — including managers? 
What makes this question especially intriguing is that Simon was a 
champion for the position that abstract symbol manipulation is the essence of 
thinking, and thus that computers, which manipulate symbols, can in principle 
be designed to think like humans (Newell and Simon 1961).  So we might expect 
to find Simon suggesting the opposite:  that computers will surely begin to outdo 
humans in many if not all areas involving “information processing.”  In one 
sense, this was indeed Simon’s view.  He makes the characteristically bold claim 
that, 
because we can now write complex information-processing 
programs for computers, we are acquiring the technical capacity to 
replace humans with computers in a rapidly widening range of 
‘thinking’ and ‘deciding’ tasks.  Closely allied to the development 
                                                                                                                                                 
to require conscious judgment, which is to say the meeting of uncertainty, the exercise of 
responsibility, in the ordinary sense of these terms.” (Knight 1921, III.X.7, pp. 294-295.) 
  - 20 -
of complex information-processing techniques for general-purpose 
computers is the rapid advance in the technique of automating all 
sorts of production and clerical tasks.  Putting these two lines of 
development together, I am led to the following general 
predictions: Within the very near future — much less than twenty-
five years — we shall have the technical capability of substituting 
machines for any and all human functions in organizations.  Within 
the same period, we shall have acquired an extensive and 
empirically tested theory of human cognitive processes and their 
interaction with human emotions, attitudes, and values (Simon 
1960, p. 22).   
One way to resolve the apparent paradox is to remember that Simon’s 
argument is based comparative advantage rather than absolute advantage.  
Under this logic, assignment to tasks is not a matter of who is better but, as we 
saw, of who is “more better.”  Just as it might be efficient to assign person B all 
the secretarial work even if A is better at both executive work and secretarial 
work, it might be efficient to assign to humans the tasks of flexible response and 
“buffering” even if computers are absolutely better at them, so long as computers 
are “more better” at routine and well-defined activities.  As Simon puts it, to 
predict that humans will have the ability to make “thinking and deciding” 
machines “says nothing of how we shall use them.”  Instead, economics -- not 
any inherent limits to AI – will determine the division of labor between humans 
and machines.  “Thus, if computers are a thousand times faster than book-
keepers in doing arithmetic, but only one hundred times faster than 
stenographers in taking dictation, we shall expect the number of bookkeepers per 
thousand employees to decrease but the number of stenographers to increase.  
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Similarly, if computers are a hundred times faster than executives in making 
investment decisions, but only ten times faster in handling employee grievances 
(the quality of the decisions being held constant), then computers will be 
employed in making investment decisions, while executives will be employed in 
handling grievances” (Simon 1960, p. 25). 
There are many, of course, who would find this a singularly unsatisfying 
resolution, since it avoids the sturm und drang of the well-documented 
controversy over artificial intelligence.  At one side of the debate, Simon always 
resolutely upheld the strongest version of the thesis that computers can in 
principle — and will soon in fact — be capable of essentially any cognitive task 
now undertaken by humans.  At the other extreme have stood critics like 
Dreyfus (1979), who contend that human brains and computers work in very 
different ways, that the computer is not a good model of human cognition, and 
that computers will never be able to do what human brains can do.  Simon’s 
proclivity for the outrageous prediction has helped keep this pot boiling.  My 
contention is that, far from sidestepping this debate, a bit of economic reasoning 
(of which the principle of comparative advantage is but one aspect) helps to 
clarify the issues – and indeed to demonstrate that the debate as it usually plays 
out is ill posed and misleading. 
Clearly, the design of machines is importantly an economic matter.  It 
pays to subdivide labor or mechanize production only when production runs are 
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large enough.  What may be less obvious is that the human machine is also in 
many respects a response to economic forces.  The human brain (and the human 
being more generally) is an evolved product, and therefore one whose design 
reflects tradeoffs motivated by resource constraints.  The field of evolutionary 
psychology (Cosmides and Tooby 1987, 1994; Pinker 1997) takes as a background 
premise that, like computers, human beings are information-processing 
machines, albeit ones designed by natural selection rather than by humans.21  For 
scientists in this tradition, understanding the human mind involves “reverse 
engineering” the brain in light of the evolutionary problem or problems to which 
that brain proved to be a solution.  The mind is thus a computer, designed for the 
manipulation of symbols; but is also a particular kind of machine, one designed 
for specific circumstances rather than for pure symbol manipulation in the 
manner of the digital computer. 
Broadly speaking, the crucible of human cognition was the entire legacy of 
evolution, but critically the last 50,000 years, most of which our ancestors spent 
as hunter-gatherers.  In this reading, evolution produced a mind well adapted to 
the needs of that lifestyle.  Recall that, for Simon, human comparative advantage 
lies in two areas: (a) sensory, manipulative, and locomotive tasks and (b) 
problem-solving and decision-making tasks.  Both of these sets of capabilities 
came in handy to the hunter-gatherers, and the two are probably interrelated 
                                                 
21  As many writers have pointed out, these design processes may not in the end be so very 
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both physiologically and in terms of evolutionary trajectory.  An upright posture 
had its advantages, as did the sensitive ability to recognize objects and patterns 
and to grasp tools and other objects effectively.  Having these skills required 
humans to develop amazingly complex robotics hardware and software. 
But human problem-solving and decision-making abilities may have been 
even more crucial.  Humans succeeded by seizing the cognitive niche (Tooby and 
DeVore 1987).  In evolutionary competition, species evolve distinctive traits to 
gain advantage.  Their competitors – including their predators and their prey – 
must rely on evolution to counter that advantage.  If lions become faster, zebra 
cannot immediately improve their agility or their camouflage.  Not so humans.  
Like the Borg on Star Trek, they can quickly analyze and adapt to the offensive 
and defensive weapons of competitors.  And they can do so on a time scale that 
is extraordinary short by evolutionary standards.  This ability to learn, adapt, 
and solve problems in a creative way enabled humans to colonize and master 
virtually every kind of environment and every part of the planet.  What made 
this success possible was the development of complex symbol-manipulation 
hardware and software, including language and the ability to amplify individual 
cognition through culture (Donald 1991). 
To Simon, sensory recognition, manipulation, and locomotion constitute 
the harder problem.  “We are much further from replacing the eyes, the hands, 
                                                                                                                                                 
different (Nelson and Nelson 2002).   
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and the legs” (Simon 1960, p. 32).  Despite some progress, we are still far from 
duplicating human perceptual-motor abilities more than 40 years after Simon 
wrote.  But what about problem solving and decision making?  Simon offered his 
characteristically bold prediction.  “Duplicating the problem-solving and 
information-handling capabilities of the brain is not far off; it would be 
surprising if it were not accomplished within the next decade” (Simon 1960, p. 
32).  We all remember the seventies for many things, but one of them is not the 
creation of computers that “duplicate” human cognitive skills.  Indeed, that may 
or may not have happened yet, depending on what one wants to count as 
“duplicating.”22 
So, was Simon wrong?  Again, I think the language of “prediction” and 
“duplication” obscures the real issues, which are that (a) human brains and 
computers are different machines with different designs and (b) what kinds of 
information-processing machines get designed will depend on economic 
considerations.  (More on that below)  Moreover, that computers can’t (yet?) 
duplicate human abilities in creative decision making and open-ended problem 
solving is not so much a matter of the failure of computers as it is a reflection of 
the success of the human brain.   
                                                 
22  In a 1994 interview in Omni magazine (and presumably elsewhere), Simon held that all of 
his predictions had come true except for the famous assertion that a computer would beat 
the human chess champion – and that one was off by only a factor of 4.   
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It is a staple of fiction that computers and robots are literal minded.  When 
secret agent Maxwell Smart tells his android assistant Hymie to “kill the lights,” 
Hymie pulls out a gun a shoots the light bulb.  In fact, computers are literal 
minded at a much more fundamental level.  The reason is that they are 
completely general symbol-manipulation engines.  This can obviously be a great 
advantage.  But it also poses the disadvantage that computers do not find ready 
at hand all the prepackaged pieces of information and all the purpose-built 
learning and processing systems we take for granted as “common sense.”  In 
cognitive science, this difficulty falls under the heading of the frame problem.   
We all have an idea of what it means for tasks to be simple or easy.  It 
turns out that what is simple or easy for a human may be damned hard for 
another kind of cognitive system.  Reaching into the refrigerator and picking out 
an egg is easy — if you are a human not a mechanical robotic arm.  Similarly, 
going to the same refrigerator to make a midnight snack (to use Dennett’s 
example) is trivial for a human but a daunting piece of decision-making for a 
computer.  The reason is that humans have a complex set of tacit understandings 
and expectations — some learned, some no doubt built in — that circumscribe 
the decision-making problem by excluding much of what is logically possible but 
irrelevant23 (Dennett 1998).  People jump to conclusions and engage in other 
                                                 
23  Phenomenological approaches to human action have long understood the importance of 
background understandings and experience, what Schütz and Luckmann (1973, p. 99) call 
the “stock of knowledge.”  It is this stock of knowledge that allows the agent to interpret 
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kinds of cognitive “cheating.”  This allows them to solve not only problems that 
would be impossibly complex for an axiomatic system but even problems that 
are overdetermined and thus have no unique analytic solution (Pinker 1997).   
Of course, Simon has also insisted that humans engage in a certain kind of 
cognitive “cheating.”  Because of the limitations of the human information-
processing system, humans suffer from “bounded rationality.”  As a result, they 
must rely on heuristics, simplified rules that can find an approximate solution to a 
complex problem at a relatively lower cost of computation.24  What has always 
seemed significant to me, however, is that Simon framed the notions of bounded 
rationality and heuristics in terms of the model of axiomatic general-purpose 
symbol processing (Langlois 1986).  “Rationality” is bounded because it cannot 
reach the correct analytical solution to a complex but well-defined problem (like 
winning in chess).  And heuristics are therefore inferior or second-best solutions.  
To many writers on the cognitive foundations of behavior, this formulation has 
its eye to the wrong end of the telescope.  Far from being inferior shortcuts to a 
general analytical solution, the rules humans follow may in fact represent a 
mode of approaching complex problems superior to that of general-purpose 
                                                                                                                                                 
reality.  Some elements of the stock of knowledge are so fundamental that they are not 
merely non-conscious but are actually “a condition of every experience in the life-world and 
enter into the horizon of experience” (Schütz and Luckmann 1973, p. 104).  Dennett (1998, p. 
188) has suggested extending phenomenology into “hetero-phenomenology,” which would 
consider the demands of action not from the perspective of what is introspectively given to 
humans but from the perspective of the pure information demands of action. 
24  A heuristic is “any principle or device that contributes to the reduction in the average search 
to solution” (Newell, Shaw, and Simon 1962, p. 85). 
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axiomatic symbol processing.  In their seminal discussion of skills, routines, and 
capabilities, Nelson and Winter (1982) invoke Simon’s notion of heuristics as an 
example of a routine.  But they move quickly to locate the ideas of skill and 
routine more firmly in the phenomenology of Simon’s intellectual opponents.  
Skills, in the end, are inexplicit rules connected to specific human performances.  
They are tacit knowledge, in Michael Polanyi’s (1958) famous phrase. 
Evolutionary psychology hints at why this is so.  For many evolutionary 
psychologists, the physiological basis for human cognitive ability resides in the 
fact that the brain is the result of layers of historical evolution and thus consists 
not in a single central-processing unit (as in a von Neumann-style computer) but 
rather in a congeries of interacting organs or faculties each “designed” by 
evolution for a different role.25  In computer terms, the brain is not a powerful 
CPU with a few simple support chips but rather a system of powerful but 
specialized co-processors governed by a relatively weak CPU.  It is still unclear 
exactly how all of this works.  And there is considerable controversy over what 
we may call the strong program of evolutionary psychology, namely, that much 
(most? all?) of human behavior can be explained in terms of specific hard-wired 
modules or faculties that evolved in specific evolutionary environments.  But 
even researchers skeptical of the strong program are increasingly inclined to see 
the brain not as a pure engine of calculation but as a “layered, hybrid modern 
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mind [that] is capable of experiencing, learning, knowing, and problem-solving, 
at all levels, sometimes employed at the same time, but in different ways” 
(Nelson and Nelson 2002, pp. 723-4). 
The future of work. 
The view from cognitive science informs our discussion in a number of ways.  It 
is far from implausible, for example, to entertain the hypothesis that the 
evolutionary environment in which our ancestors found themselves may offer 
clues to the cognitive strengths and weaknesses of present-day humans as pieces 
of the productive system.  Hunter-gatherers were clearly adaptors and creative 
problem solvers.  They were highly skilled in the sense developed earlier: they 
needed to know many different routines and had the ability to switch among 
tasks.  Surely most of the cognitive background assumptions of our ancestors’s 
environment carry over to our own at all but the most superficial levels: objects 
still tend to fall down not up, etc.  Thus, an information-processing system that is 
highly specialized and domain specific along a computational dimension 
becomes a general-purpose technology along an economic dimension.  Human 
beings can do all sorts of things competently and flexibly, albeit at low rates of 
throughput.  They are thus well suited to a wide range of tasks with similar 
                                                                                                                                                 
25  And, if Antonio Damasio (1994) is right, organs and systems outside of the brain proper are 
also part of the cognitive process — of the mind. 
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cognitive profiles, from driving trucks to repairing trucks to running the 
Teamsters Union.  Humans are natural “buffers.”  
At another level, the view from cognitive science suggests something 
about machines as well.  In effect, nature solves the frame problem by enlisting 
the division of labor.  Human “common sense” arises from specialization to the 
contours and demands of a specific environment.  Moreover, the evolution of 
flexible cognition is the exception not the rule (Pinker 1977, p. 154).  Nature’s 
tendency on the whole is to create idiots-savants not general-purpose problem 
solvers: lightning-fast cheetahs, bats that echolocate, birds that navigate by the 
stars.26  The human brain itself may be a congeries of specialized idiots-savants 
who work together.  So we as humans should not see it as odd that all we seem 
to be able to create are machines that do a narrow set of things well.   
It makes good economic sense for machines to be idiots-savants, for the 
reasons Smith explained.  Moreover, as robotics research has revealed, it is 
almost always cheaper to change the environment so that it demands less 
flexibility than it is to create an adaptation to a complex environment.  If we want 
high throughput, we are well advised to stabilize the environment and simplify 
the computational demands of the task structure.  If you want a personal 
computer built to your specifications, you can wander into your local mom-and-
                                                 
26  In this and in earlier passages I have lapsed into the rhetorical trope of nature as designer.  
Of course I don’t mean that literally, and the reader should take this locution as 
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pop computer shop, where the proprietor can no doubt be induced to order the 
necessary parts and put them together for you.  But if you want to produce 
personal computers to specification at extremely high volumes and significantly 
lower costs, you are far better off setting up an automated production and 
distribution system of the sort pioneered by Dell (Kraemer and Dedrick 2001).  
The Dell system won’t enquire about your grandchildren (unless some wag 
programs the website to do that), nor will it go home and fry up an egg for its 
son’s supper.  But the point is that we shouldn’t want it to. 
Just as the human being is a general-purpose technology precisely because 
of its cognitive specialization, the computer is an idiot-savant because of its 
cognitive generality.  Of course, the computer is a general-purpose technology in 
economic terms, since it can be reprogrammed easily to take on a wide variety of 
specialized computational tasks (Langlois 2002).  Giving a computer common 
sense is hard, but through software we can make computers into virtually any 
idiot-savant we choose.  And that is exactly what we should want to do. 
Even in the age of computers, high-throughput production is about 
altering the environment to reduce variation.  In Ford’s original version of the 
assembly line, everything was pre-programmed so that square pegs always 
appeared to match every square hole; eliminating variation meant eliminating 
                                                                                                                                                 
incorporating by reference a wholly Darwinian account of the sort so well expounded by 
Richard Dawkins (1986) 
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round pegs not just whales and bowls of petunias.  This is why it was an 
important part of Ford’s manufacturing concept that the product be identical so 
as to permit as high a throughput at as low a cost as possible.  At least since the 
jacquard loom, however, batch processing has actually been able to handle 
certain kinds of variety rather easily.  So long as variety is predictable — that is, 
so long as variety means a selection from a restricted set of known possibilities —
machines can be taught to recognize and deal with it.  To resurrect some 
terminology I proposed a long time ago (Langlois 1984), I will describe this as 
parametric variation — variation from within a known set mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive possibilities.  Any other kind of variation I will call 
structural variation.27  Distinguishing among square, round, and triangular pegs 
is a parametric matter.  Dealing with whales and bowls of petunias is a structural 
matter.  Computers like those in the Dell production system have lowered the 
cost of managing parametric variation.  You can choose from a wide menu of 
processors, memory, drives, etc.; but if it’s not on the menu, you can’t have it. 
It is for fundamentally economic reasons, then, that we should continue to 
see machines crowd humans out of tasks in which computers have comparative 
advantage, namely tasks involving predictable, repetitive sequences of activities, 
including potentially complex but well structured calculations.  This also implies 
that humans will crowd into activities in which humans have comparative 
                                                 
27  Metin Coşgel and I (1993) argue that this distinction actually tracks Frank Knight’s more 
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advantage, namely tasks involving flexibility and adaptability, especially in the 
areas of problem solving and perceptual-motor activities.   
In her study of how information technology has altered the organization 
of work, Shoshana Zuboff (1988) shows that this process has been going on for 
some time.  Interestingly, this is especially clear in the realm of symbol-
processing tasks like management and office work, where the need for judgment 
and buffering has long been moving up the hierarchy.   
Elements of managerial work most easily subjected to 
rationalization were “carved out” of the manager’s activities.  The 
foundational example of this process is the rationalization of 
executive work, which was accomplished by ejecting those 
elements that could be explicated and systematized, preserving 
intact the skills that comprise executive craft.  It was the carving out 
of such elements that created the array of functions we now 
associate with middle management.  A similar process accounts for 
the origins of clerical work.  In each case, the most easily 
rationalized features of the activities at one level were carved out, 
pushed downward, and used to create wholly new lower-level 
jobs.  In this process higher-level positions were not eliminated; on 
the contrary, they came to be seen more than ever as the depository 
of the organization’s skills. (Zuboff 1988, p. 98.) 
Although perhaps less obvious at first, change in mechanical tasks has followed 
a similar trajectory.  The division of labor tends to make tasks more routine and 
therefore to “deskill” those who undertake those tasks.  But, as we saw, that very 
routinization enables “skilled” integrative machines to displace those deskilled 
workers.  It is such machinery (rather than to specialized humans) to which the 
                                                                                                                                                 
famous (and widely misunderstood) distinction between risk and uncertainty.   
  - 33 -
most easily rationalized tasks are ultimately “ejected,” leaving humans the more 
discretionary tasks of tending, maintenance, and design in which they have 
cognitive comparative advantage.   
Both Simon (1997) and Zuboff cite a study of worker attitudes by Robert 
Blauner (1964) that examined four kinds of industries:  crafts (printing), fordist 
assembly (automobiles), machine tending (textiles), and continuous-process 
(chemicals).  As one might expect, workers found fordist assembly and machine 
tending less pleasant than crafts production; but not so continuous-process 
production.  In that type of industry, mechanization had proceeded farther, and 
machines had taken over most of the routine activities, leaving workers the more 
interesting – more crafts-like – tasks of maintenance and problem solving.  
Blauner is right to see continuous process technology as the future of 
mechanization.  Because of their cognitive comparative advantage, machines are 
likely to continue to absorb routine and well-defined tasks, thereby becoming 
more integrated and thus making production more continuous. 
The process of crowding humans into tasks suitable for human cognition 
is not confined to the shop floor or the interior of the firm.  Within the larger 
market economy, we ought to expect the same general phenomenon.  Simon 
envisioned humans filling a variety of roles. 
• Lower-level buffering workers.  These would include workers in 
small-scale tasks requiring human hand-eye-brain coordination.  
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Such tasks would include routine or repetitive activities not worth 
automating or costly to automate.  (The American system of road 
transport, designed for human drivers, comes to mind.) 
• Maintenance workers, including those engaged in preventive 
maintenance.  Someone has to clean up the mess when a whale or a 
bowl of petunias comes down the assembly line. 
• Bosses.  These are a kind of maintenance worker — people who 
deal with and plan for the non-routine.  Simon notes, quite rightly, 
that redesign of production and mechanization is likely to lead to 
less need for management as “supervision.” 
• Designers, which includes not only designers of products and 
processes but also managers at the highest levels, who are 
designers of organizations.  
• Those involved in personal-service occupations, who have to deal 
with the most unpredictable environment of all — other humans.  
Which occupations remain personal-service ones will depend, 
however, on which can be more cheaply redesigned to eliminate 
variation.  In banking, automated tellers reduced the number of 
human tellers.  But in the restaurant business, the automat of the 
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1950s failed miserably in displacing what we now refer to as the 
“waitperson.” 
Simon seems to suggest that, as automation proceeds, humans will progressively 
shift down this list, away from not-yet-automated assembly tasks and routine 
maintenance and into design, management, and personal service.  Voilà the 
service economy, already clearly envisioned forty years ago. 
Will this be a better place?  Clearly this sort of analysis cannot answer a 
question of such weight and complexity.  But it does arguably cast light on one 
important aspect.  Even the most routine sorts of jobs into which humans are 
likely to be shunted — like truck drivers or hairdressers — are clearly crafts 
occupations in the sense described earlier.  They require the operative to switch 
among a wide set of routines and tasks, and they present that operative with a 
wide variety of stimuli.  This speaks directly to one of the crucial considerations 
in the debate about technology: the issue of cognitive narrowing that so troubled 
Adam Smith and many others.  Indeed, the present analysis would argue 
strongly against any criticism of mechanization aimed fundamentally at the 
issues of task narrowing or deskilling. 
Of course, one could always conjure up unpleasant visions of a future 
knowledge economy (as the service economy is now called) on other grounds.  In 
his cyber-punk short story ”The Beautiful and the Sublime,” Bruce Sterling (1989) 
gives us a future in which the advance of automation has moved the domain of 
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human tasks so far down Simon’s list that artists and aesthetes have become the 
rising dominant class.  This is not necessarily all to the good, if the shallow and 
self-absorbed narrator and his friends are meant to be representative.  Or maybe 
Simon is right in this as well:  “perhaps more of us will be salesmen” (Simon 
1960, p. 38). 
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